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Abstract. This paper provides laboratory evidence on the efficiency-enhancing properties of the 
Tiebout model as a decentralized system of public goods provision. Tiebout (1956) shows that if a 
sufficient  number  of  local  communities  exist  to  accommodate  different  types  of  preferences, 
individuals sort themselves in a way that provides an efficient allocation of public goods and taxes. 
Our  experiment  aims  to  disentangle  the  effect  of  voting  participation  and  is  composed  of  two 
treatments. In the non-participation treatment, local public good provision is chosen by only one 
subject,  while  the  other  members  of  the  community  can  only  stay  in  or  moves  to  another 
community. In the participation treatment, all the community members have the right to vote as 
well as to move to another community and collective decisions are taken by majority rule. Our 
findings  show  that  social  welfare  is  greater  in  the  participation  than  in  the  non-participation 
treatment.  We  conclude  that  voting  with  one‟s  feet  increases  efficiency  if  all  the  community 
members vote and that the influence of voting participation on the allocation of local public goods 
should be taken into account to assess the viability of the Tiebout model. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The argument pointed out by Tiebout‟s (1956) pioneering paper that individuals vote with 
their feet has become the pillar of the theory of fiscal federalism. If households are free to move 
from one local community to another, they sort themselves into groups that are homogeneous in 
relation to their preferences for public goods. In this way, the local allocation tends to be efficient 
like the general equilibrium solution for the market economy.
3 By providing a means of ensuring 
efficiency, the Tiebout model set the agenda in the fields of  public finance and urban economics 
inspiring a large body of theoretical and empirical research. 
Most  theoretical  work  is  aimed  at  formalizing  the  analytical  conditions   under  which 
community  mobility  results  in  the existence  of  stable  and  efficient  equilibria   (Richter 1978, 
Wooders 1980, Bewley 1981, Konishi 1996, Seabright 1996, Nechyba 1997, Kollman et al 1997, 
Coonly and Wooders 2001, Besley and Coate 2003, Kessler and Lülfesmann 2005, Zheng 2008). 
The  implications  of  these  conditions   have  been  investigated  empirically  in  numerous  ways: 
according to the type, number and size of the local communities, the level of member heterogeneity, 
the features of political institutions, and the technology of public goods production (Dowding et al. 
1994, Oates 1999, Rhode and Strumpf 2003,  Dawkins 2005, Calabrese et al. 2006, Banzhaf and 
Walsh 2008,  Hall  and Roos 2010).  More recently, the model  has been  investigated  through 
laboratory experiments focusing on the methods of cost sharing and group formation (Hewett et al. 
2001, Gailmard and Palfrey 2002, Brouhle et al. 2005, Ones and Putterman 2007, Ahn et al 2009, 
Gurerk et al. 2009) 
This paper investigates a particular aspect not yet studied in the laboratory. The validity of 
the Tiebout model depends on the joint effect of voting by ballots and by feet. A common approach 
to modeling voting is to adopt the median voter‟s demand as the equilibrium outcome, which is to 
assume that all the residents express their vote. However, literature on ethnic diversity points out 
that income inequality and racial fragmentation are factors which decrease voting participation and 
which may consequently affect the efficiency of public goods provision. To investigate this issue, 
we have conducted two experimental treatments differentiated by the group decision rule. In the 
non-participation treatment, only one subject in each community determines which and how many 
                                                           
3  “If  consumer-voters  are  fully  mobile,  the  appropriate  local  governments,  whose  revenue-expenditure 
patterns are set, are adopted by the consumer-voters. While the solution may not be perfect because of 
institutional  rigidities,  this  does  not  invalidate  its  importance.  The  solution,  like  a  general  equilibrium 
solution for a private spatial economy, is the best that can be obtained given preferences and resource 
endowments.” (Tiebout 1956, p. 424) 3 
 
public goods to produce, while the other subjects can merely decide to stay in or move to another 
community.  In this treatment members do not express their voting preference on local public good 
allocation. In the participation treatment, all the community members have the right to vote as well 
as to move to another community and decision are taken by majority rule.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, background literature is reviewed. Section 3 
illustrates  experimental  design  and  starting  hypotheses.  Laboratory  findings  are  presented  and 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Background literature 
 
A survey of the empirical studies of the Tiebout model is beyond the scope of this paper, 
since such studies “are legion and multifarious” as argued by Dowding et al. (1994, p. 767) who 
hold  that  there  are  two  main  types  of  applied  studies:  firstly,  research  focused  on  testing  the 
implications of the model, and secondly, on verifying its assumptions. Dowding et al. (1994) group 
this  literature  under  five  headings:  community-size  interpretations,  homogeneity  interpretations, 
migrations, micro-level tests, and tax capitalizations studies. Starting with Oates‟ (1969) seminal 
paper, the latter issue is probably the earlier and most frequent object of analysis, but the question 
of how taxes and local service discrepancies are capitalized into property values is an issue beyond 
the focus of our research. Our focus, rather, is on the impact that heterogeneity of preference and 
migration flows have on the efficient allocation of public goods. 
   Concluding  their  survey,  Dowding  et  al.  (1994)  argue  that  the  large  body  of  research 
reasonably supports the conclusions that: 
a)  the number of local communities is a positive factor in relation to the level of satisfaction of 
the public goods provided;  
b)  community homogeneity enhances the efficiency of public goods allocation;  
c)  migration patterns are not apparently affected by differences in the types of taxes and locally 
provided goods. 
More  recently,  a  variety  of  empirical  studies  have  tested  these  assessments  with  mixed 
results, summarized by Oates (2005). Introducing the survey, Oates emphasizes the passage from 
the first to the second generation of fiscal federalism, which is characterized by the inclusion in the 
field  of  public  economics  of  new  theoretical  concepts  and  analysis  methods  borrowed  from 
information economics and, particularly, from political sciences. Oates attributes this shift of focus 4 
 
to the awareness that “participants in political processes (both voters and officials) have their own 
objective functions which they seek to maximize in a political setting that provides constraints on 
their behavior” (Oates 2005, p. 356) 
The Tiebout model is indeed very informal and highly stylized in terms of institutional 
features.  Tiebout‟s  original  intent  was  to  extend  to  the  local  public  sector  the  Pareto-efficient 
outcome of the competitive model, where contextual details are practically neglected.
4  However, an 
issue that is generally underestimated in literature is the huge impact that immigration flows have 
on  local community  heterogeneity  and, consequently,  on  voting participation.  In terms of  the 
validity of the Tiebout model, even if the sorting process is actually in force, the increase of within-
heterogeneity due to migration could be higher than the increase of between-heterogeneity due to 
foot voting.  
This argument is strictly related to another issue mentioned in the introduction. Efficiency in 
the Tiebout model relies on the combined effect of voting with the feet and voting by ballot. A very 
common assumption, which has relevant normative properties, is that the equilibrium outcome  is 
determined by the median voter model. By assuming that all residents are rational and choose fiscal 
programs  by  calculating  individual  benefits  and  costs,  preferences for local public goods  are 
revealed without the active intervention of  politics (Sjoquist 1981,  Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 
Fischel 2001). On the contrary, as pointed out by Kollman et al. (1997),  Ross and Yinger (1999) 
and  Congleton (2003),  public good allocation  is highly  sensitive to assumptions  about  voting 
procedures and participation. Apart from being exceedingly simplistic and empirically non-testable, 
the viability of the  median voter model is limited by the effect of immigration. Migration flows 
hamper voting participation, since there is an increasing percentage of residents in each community 
who do not  take part in collective decision, either because they are marginal (ethnic minorities, 
illegal immigrants, abstensionists) or because they are very mobile and do not expect to stay in a 
given community long enough to benefit from participation. 
These stylized facts have been investigated by a number of studies on the economic effects 
of ethnic diversity, the key assumption being that migration is a significant factor in decreasing the 
stock of social capital. The term social capital was employed by Putnam (1993) to describe the 
dense and strongly tied civic networks characterizing highly cohesive communities like the Italian 
industrial districts. In the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, Putnam (2007) addresses the migration-
led growth of ethnic diversity in most advanced countries as the key factor explaining the decline of 
social  capital.  With  reference  to  the  United  States,  Putnam  provides  evidence  that  greater 
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heterogeneity  is  associated  with  lower  frequency  of  voter  registration  and  lower  confidence  in 
personal political efficacy, that is, the individual perception of influencing the determination of 
public policies. The effect of immigration is that a fundamental requisite of social capital, voting 
participation,  is  increasingly  restricted  to  the  more  stable  community,  which  converges  on  a 
restricted set of public policies and hinders the participation of the other members of the community 
to electoral processes. By rephrasing Hirschman (1970), ethnically fragmented communities exhibit 
a tendency of the immigrants to waive the „voice‟ option by not using their right to vote thereby 
limiting themselves to only exercising the „exit‟ option.  
More generally, ethnic heterogeneity reduces civic engagement and political participation. 
Broadly  speaking,  political  participation  includes  not  only  voting,  but  also  taking  part  in 
establishing  and  running  political  organizations,  running  for  office,  performing  duties  in 
representative and consultative bodies, campaigning, and taking part in protests.  Borck (2002) 
provides  theoretical  arguments  to  show  that  political  participation  increases  with  income  and 
decreases with population size and, consequently, is inversely related to immigration growth. Costa 
and  Kahn  (2004)  survey  and  produce  empirical  evidence  that  in  United  States  and  European 
communities heterogeneity lowers civic engagement and, specifically, voting participation. Alesina 
and Ferrara (2000) argue, first theoretically, that the increase of population heterogeneity induces 
less political participation, and then, empirically, that ethnic fragmentation is inversely related to 
organizational  membership.  However,  there  is  wide  consensus  in  literature  on  the  benefits  of 
democratic regimes to temper the negative economic effects of community fragmentation (Collier 
2000, Alesina and Glaeser 2004).  
To  address  this  issue  in  the  laboratory,  we  conduct  an  experiment  consisting  of  two 
treatments. In the non-participation treatment, only one subject, randomly chosen, determines in 
each community the type and the quantity of provided local public goods, while the other subjects 
are only free to stay in or to move to another community. In the participation treatment, all the 
residents have the right to vote and to move to another community and decisions are taken by 
majority rule. The two treatments are intended to compare the case of one community where the 
median  voter  equilibrium  is  applied  due  to  the  fact  that  all  the  participants  vote  with  another 
community in which a majority of members is so cohesive that collective choices are reached in 
such  a  way  so  as  to  seem  representative  of  one  sole  individual.  From  the  comparison  across 





3.  Design and hypotheses 
 
The experiment was run at the Universities of Florence and of Siena between January 2009 
and December 2010 and consisted of two treatments, each composed of three sessions. Subjects 
were recruited from the Political Science Faculty in Firenze and the Economics Faculty in Siena. 
Each subject spent about 80 minutes in the lab and earned on average 12.4 Euros. The laboratory of 
experimental economics LabSi (http://www.labsi.org) provided the technical and practical support 
for the experiment, which was computerized using Z-tree software. During the sessions the subjects 
were positioned at computer terminals in separate seats to prevent communication or visual contact 
between participants. For each treatment we conducted pilot tests. The experimental instructions are 
available upon request. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design. 
Table 1. Summary of the Design 
Session  Preference set  Treatment  Participants (women + men) 
1  A  Participation   15    (7 + 8) 
2  B  Participation   15    (6 + 9) 
3  C  Participation   15    (7 + 8) 
4  A  Non-participation   15    (8 + 7) 
5  B  Non-participation   15    (9 + 6) 
6  C  Non-participation   15    (7 + 8) 
Total       90  (44 + 46) 
 
Both treatments were made up of 10 periods. In the first period, subjects were randomly 
divided into communities, each of which was allowed to provide only one of four possible public 
goods. Individual preferences over the four public goods were randomly allocated at the beginning 
of the session to each subject. To allow for comparison, the same preference sets (A, B, C) were 
repeated identically in both treatments, making subject heterogeneity identical across treatments.  
In the participation treatment, all the members of each community determined the type and 
the quantity of the public good provided by majority rule and, after each period, all the subjects 
could decide whether to stay or to move to another community. In the non-participation treatment, 
only one member in each community was randomly selected as the decision maker to decide the 
type and the quantity of the public good provided, while the other members did not vote and were 
only able to move to another community after each period. 
Each session started with the random allocation of fifteen subjects to five communities of 
three members each. In the first period, subjects were given four random playing cards, which 7 
 
represented  the  individual  preferences  over  the  four  possible  types  of  public  goods  for  all  the 
session (Table 2). The cards randomly selected in each session of the participation treatment were 
the same exact cards used in the corresponding sessions of the non-participation treatment.  
The suit of the cards, diamonds (♦), hearts (♥), clubs (♣), and spades (♠), determined the 
type of public good, while the number on the cards, from 1 to 5, the intensity of preference for the 
public good. The level of preference for each public good was given by the sum of the number of 
cards for each suit. For example, in preference set A subject 1, who received a three of diamonds, a 
three of spades, a two of clubs, and a one of spades preferred the public good spades, because he 
obtained  a  benefit  of  four  (three  plus  one)  from  spades  which  was  higher  than  the  value  of 
diamonds (three), hearts (zero) and clubs (two).  
 
Table 2. Cards Allocation by Preference Set 
    Set of Preferences  
 
Subject  Group 
A  B  C 
1  1  ♦3  ♠3  ♣2  ♠1  ♦1  ♣4  ♦2  ♠1  ♥3  ♣2  ♥1  ♣4 
2  1  ♠4  ♦5  ♥1  ♥3  ♦1  ♠2  ♥4  ♦2  ♣1  ♦3  ♥4  ♣1 
3  1  ♣5  ♥3  ♥3  ♥2  ♦1  ♠2  ♥4  ♦2  ♥4  ♠1  ♥2  ♥3 
4  2  ♣5  ♥2  ♣5  ♦1  ♥3  ♣2  ♣3  ♥1  ♥1  ♠3  ♦1  ♣4 
5  2  ♥3  ♦1  ♦5  ♠1  ♦4  ♠4  ♦5  ♣2  ♠2  ♦1  ♥1  ♦2 
6  2  ♣5  ♠4  ♣3  ♥4  ♥4  ♥1  ♦5  ♥2  ♦4  ♠3  ♦3  ♣2 
7  3  ♦5  ♠4  ♥4  ♦5  ♣5  ♣3  ♠2  ♥4  ♦3  ♥5  ♦3  ♥1 
8  3  ♠2  ♠4  ♠2  ♥1  ♦3  ♦2  ♦5  ♣3  ♣1  ♣5  ♣2  ♥2 
9  3  ♥1  ♠1  ♦1  ♥2  ♥1  ♥5  ♣2  ♠1  ♠2  ♥5  ♣3  ♠2 
10  4  ♣2  ♣1  ♣2  ♠2  ♠3  ♠2  ♦3  ♣1  ♣4  ♦2  ♦4  ♦2 
11  4  ♣3  ♥5  ♠3  ♥2  ♣1  ♦3  ♣1  ♠1  ♣2  ♣3  ♦2  ♣5 
12  4  ♦3  ♣2  ♦1  ♦3  ♣3  ♦3  ♠1  ♦1  ♦1  ♣4  ♦4  ♦1 
13  5  ♦2  ♣3  ♦5  ♣1  ♦5  ♦3  ♥4  ♥1  ♦1  ♦1  ♠3  ♥4 
14  5  ♥3  ♣1  ♦3  ♦5  ♠3  ♠2  ♣3  ♥1  ♥3  ♦4  ♥1  ♥5 
15  5  ♠4  ♣2  ♣1  ♣4  ♣1  ♠1  ♣4  ♦2  ♣4  ♥1  ♠1  ♣1 
 
The individual benefit was determined by the level of public good provision chosen by the 
community. In the example above, if the community of subject 1 chose a quantity of the  public 
good “spades” lower than 4, i.e. 3, subject 1 obtained a benefit equal to 3, which represented the 8 
 
non-rival part of the benefit given by the public good. If the chosen quantity was equal or greater 
than 4, the subject‟s benefit was exactly four.  
Formally, the individual benefit (B) for a provided k quantity of the local public good i was 
given by: 
B = Min {k, sum of cards of suit i} 
In this way, excess provision over the quantity k increases taxes but not benefit. The total 
cost (TC) of the public good provided by each community was determined by the product of the 
chosen  quantity  (k)  and  the  unitary  fixed  cost  (FC).  This  cost  was  shared  evenly  among  the 
members of the community (N).  
Thus, the individual payoff (P) was given by the difference between the community level 
provision and the individual tax cost (TC/N) paid.  
P = B – TC/N =  Min {k, sum of cards of suit i} – (k)(FC)/N 
Note that the payoff P could also be negative in the event that the public good i had been 
overprovided in relation to the sum of the cards having the suits i.  
Lastly, the welfare (W) of each community was obtained by the sum of the payoffs P of all 
the community members, and the social welfare (TW) was calculated by summing the welfare W of 
all the communities. 
At the end of each period, after determining community public good provisions, subjects 
were informed of their own individual payoff, the type and quantity of public goods provided, the 
individual tax costs and the number of components in all the communities
5. After the first period, in 
the participation treatment all participants were free to stay or to move to a different community, 
while in the  non-participation  treatment  the decision-maker could  not move  and all  the other 
subjects were free to stay or to  move to another community. At the end of the ten periods, total 
individual payoffs were computed and subjects were paid in cash according to the predetermined 
conversion rate. 
In the participation treatment, public good provision was decided within each community by 
majority rule. The voting procedure was divided into two phases. In the first phase, each member 
was asked to express their preference for the chosen suit/public good.  Afterwards, all the votes 
expressed by the members of the community were shown on the screen and each subject was asked 
to confirm or to change  their  vote  by observing in real time the decisions taken by the other 
                                                           
5 In the no participation treatment, there were five communities during all the periods, one for each decision-
maker.  In  the  participation  treatment,  after  the  first  periods  the  number  of  communities  could  change 
according to the subjects‟ decision to stay or to move.   9 
 
community  members.  In  the  second  phase  the  same  procedure  was  repeated  to  determine  the 
quantity of the chosen public good to be produced.  
 
 
4.  Results  
 
The discussion of results is organized as follows. First, we compare social welfare across 
treatments by looking at the dynamics of cost per capita and produced quantity. Then, we analyze 
subjects‟ choices to verify if they adhere to predictions of the Tiebout model. In this way, we intend 
to verify if heterogeneity of public good preferences and of voting participation invalidates the 
efficiency enhancing property of Tiebout‟s sorting.  
 
A.  Social Welfare 
Result 1. Voting participation increases social welfare.  
Findings confirm that voting with one‟s feet increases efficiency only if all members are 
allowed to vote by ballot. Table 3 and Figure 1 show the dynamics of social welfare for the two 
treatments and the three preference sets.  
 
Table 3. Social Welfare by Preference sets and Treatments 
  Preference sets 
A  B  C 
Round  Participation  Non-
Participation  Participation  Non-
Participation  Participation  Non- 
Participation 
1  9  21  26  12  25  23 
2  38  36  37  19  30  43 
3  30  34  40  30  33  17 
4  45  31  49  38  32  24 
5  35  33  52  39  32  29 
6  42  38  41  21  33  32 
7  54  47  53  27  34  7 
8  50  45  53  33  23  28 
9  40  45  51  36  31  22 
10  49  40  39  29  49  28 
Mean   39.2  37.0  44.1  28.4  32.2  25.3 
 
The increase of social welfare is greater (in absolute value) with the participation treatment 
than  the  non-participation  treatment.  Data  analysis  shows  that,  although  the  hypothesis  of  an 10 
 
increasing trend of social welfare is rejected for both treatments
6, the mean of social welfare is 
significantly different in the two treatments. The t-values for the two-sample mean comparison test 
are -0.46 for  preference set  A, -3.94 for B and  -1.86 for C, which allows us to re ject the null 
hypothesis that the mean of the two samples are equal at least for the preference sets B and C.  
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6  The  Cuzick‟s  (1985)  test  on  the  social  welfare  obtained  by  each  group  gives  the  following  z-values  for  the 
participation and non participation, respectively: z=0.03 (p=0.979),  z=0.91 (p=0.364) for the preference set A, z=-0.91 
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Result 2. The greater increase of social welfare in the participation treatment is achieved 
mainly by reducing cost per capita than by changing quantity.  
Voting participation lowers the per capita cost of public goods provision, whereas in the 
non-participation treatment the average cost per capita is nearly constant along all the experiment. 
On the contrary, the provided quantities do not differ significantly across treatments. 
Table 4 shows that in the participation treatment the per capita cost increases in the first half 
of the session and then decreases for all the preference sets at the 5
th/6
th round. The cost per capita 
of the last round is equal to or lower than the average cost and reaches its maximum at the third 
(preference set A and B) or fourth round (C). In the non participation treatment the cost per capita 
reaches its maximum level in the 7
th round (A) and in the last round (B and C).  12 
 
 
Table 4. Average Cost per capita  
  Preference sets 
A  B  C 
Round  Participation  Non-
participation  Participation  Non-
participation  Participation  Non-
participation 
1  1.60  2.22  1.53  2.36  1.33  1.94 
2  1.57  2.24  3.15  2.33  1.50  1.94 
3  4.98  2.21  3.33  2.32  1.78  1.95 
4  1.44  2.24  1.65  2.46  3.63  1.98 
5  1.93  2.27  1.56  2.54  3.42  1.94 
6  0.88  2.33  1.13  2.59  1  1.84 
7  1.29  2.34  1.33  2.87  1.43  1.95 
8  1.58  2.28  1.25  3.01  2.05  2.18 
9  1.15  2.27  1.29  3.25  1.04  1.95 
10  1.83  2.34  0.75  4.23  1.78  2.51 
Mean   1.83  2.27  1.70  2.80  1.90  2.02 
 
Average costs per capita are lower in the participation treatment than in the non participation 
treatment for all the preference sets. In contrast, the provided quantities do not differ significantly 
across treatments (see Table 5). On average, the quantities produced are significantly different only 
for the preference set B (t-value=2.219), but not for A and C (t-values, respectively, equal to -0.171 
and -0.642). 
 
Table 5. Average Quantity per capita  
  Preference set 
A  B  C 
Round  Participation  Non-
participation  Participation  Non-
participation  Participation  Non- 
participation 
1  4.8  5.2  4.6  3.0  4.2  5.6 
2  5.6  5.6  5.2  6.0  5.8  5.4 
3  7.4  3.8  6.2  3.2  7.4  5.0 
4  3.6  4.0  5.3  3.8  5.8  4.8 
5  4.8  3.6  6.7  4.4  4.8  5.0 
6  3.2  4.6  4.0  3.6  1.8  4.0 
7  4.2  5.2  6.3  4.2  3.6  2.8 
8  4.0  4.2  5.0  4.2  6.4  4.4 
9  3.2  3.4  6.0  4.2  4.0  3.0 
10  4.6  5.0  4.0  6.4  4.0  4.0 






B.  Individual Choices and Group Heterogeneity  
Result 3. Moving decisions are positively related to individual payoffs.  
The number of individual displacements has a positive relation to the increase of individual 
payoffs in both treatments, whereas in the non-participation treatment the increase of welfare has a 
positive correlation with the correct choice of moving or not moving only if the community is 
appropriately chosen. 
We analyze the relation between voting with one‟s feet and the individual payoff in three 
ways. Firstly, we run an OLS regression, in which the dependent variable is the difference between 
the  individual  payoff  of  the  first  and  the  last  round.  Secondly,  we  estimate  a  Probit  model  to 
investigate  the  individual  moving  decisions.  In  particular,  we  test  the  hypothesis  that  subjects 
decide to change community by comparing the individual payoff with the payoffs attainable in the 
other  communities.  Finally,  we  check  if  the  chosen  community  is  the  optimal  choice  for  each 
subject.  
Table 6 shows that the number of individual displacements has a positive relation to the 
increase of individual payoffs for both treatments and all preference sets, with the only exception of 
the preference set C in the non-participation treatment. The OLS model also shows that in both 
treatments the relation between the increase of welfare and the appropriately taken decision of 
moving or not  moving is  positive, although  in the non-participation  treatment  the relation  also 
depends  on  the  chosen  community.  This  finding  may  be  interpreted  as  a  consequence  of  the 
differences in the moving decision across the two treatments. Differently from voting subjects, 
subjects who are not allowed to vote should condition their choice using a double calculation: firstly 
they have to assess if their payoffs may be higher in a different community, secondly they need to 







Table 6. Welfare Differences between the Last and the First Round – OLS estimation  
  Preference sets 
A  B  C 
Round  Participation  Non-participation  Participation  Non-
participation  Participation  Non-
participation 
Nr of moving 
decisions in all 
rounds 
1.019***  0.295**  0.278***  0.380***  0.325***  -0.480*** 
  (0.098)  (0.142)  (0.103)  (0.088)  (0.070)  (0.090) 
Nr. of rounds in 
which one subject 
with an opposite 
Spearman coefficient 
is met  
-0.439***  -0.168  -3.320***  2.440***  -0.813***  0.447*** 
  (0.063)  (0.120)  (0.593)  (0.275)  (0.242)  (0.084) 
Nr. of rounds in 
which at least two 
people with an 
opposite Spearman 
coefficient are met 
-0.576***  -0.091  -0.096  -0.419*  -0.729***  0.511*** 




1.106***  -1.003***  4.795***  -0.481***  -0.544***  0.076 
  (0.147)  (0.289)  (0.275)  (0.148)  (0.172)  (0.364) 
Community in which 
the individual move 
is chosen rightly 
-0.291***  1.625***  -5.218***  0.577***  0.783***  0.060 
  (0.102)  (0.241)  (0.317)  (0.158)  (0.115)  (0.165) 
Constant  -4.460***  -3.230***  4.991***  -1.552  2.729**  0.615 
  (0.765)  (1.223)  (0.806)  (1.023)  (1.254)  (1.960) 
             
Observations  150  100  150  100  150  100 
R-squared  0.764  0.685  0.787  0.667  0.762  0.444 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (standard errors in parentheses ) 
 
By looking at disaggregate data, the Probit model (Table 7) shows that a negative payoff is 
associated with the decision to change community. Data analysis also confirms that most moving 







Table 7. Moving / Non-Moving Decisions – OLS estimation  
  Preference sets 
A  B  C 
Round  Participation  Non-
Participation  Participation  Non-
Participation  Participation  Non-
Participation 
Individual loss in the previous 
round(dummy)  1.972***  2.160***  1.174***    2.004***  1.642*** 
  (0.374)  (0.550)  (0.268)    (0.422)  (0.378) 
Decision taken in the first five 
rounds(dummy)  0.564**  0.889***    0.529*  1.398***  -0.229 
  (0.263)  (0.313)    (0.276)  (0.388)  (0.310) 
Presence of at least one subject 
with an opposite Spearman 
coefficient 
1.137***  -0.540    0.425    1.063*** 
  (0.308)  (0.418)    (0.388)    (0.352) 
Presence of at least two people 
with an opposite Spearman 
coefficient 
0.744**  0.033    -0.596    0.010 
  (0.336)  (0.398)    (0.651)    (0.483) 
Different individual vote on the 
type of good produced      1.278***       
      (0.487)       
Different individual vote on the 
quantity of good produced      0.623**       
      (0.243)       
Constant  -1.700***  -1.184***  -1.277***  -0.698***  -2.277***  -0.639*** 
  (0.265)  (0.251)  (0.205)  (0.197)  (0.368)  (0.219) 
             
Observations  150  100  150  100  150  100 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (standard errors in parentheses ) 
 
 
Result  4.  Heterogeneity  within  groups  is  not  statistically  significant  or  related  with  the 
social welfare if Subjects are not allowed to vote.  
In  the  participation  treatment,  the  increase  in  social  welfare  is  negatively  related  to  the 
number of rounds in which subjects met a person with a Spearman coefficient of the opposite sign, 
while  in  the  non-participation  treatment  the  within-group  heterogeneity  is  not  significantly 
correlated with the welfare increase. 
The  effect  of  preferences  heterogeneity  on  public  goods  provision  is  also  assessed  by 
calculating the Spearman rank correlation coefficients among subjects. In this way we test if the 
presence of one or two subjects with a correlation coefficient with the opposite sign in one‟s own 
community explains the difference in individual welfare attained between the  first  and the last 
round of treatments. 
The variable “number of rounds in which a person (or at least two people) with an opposite 
SC is (are) met” in the OLS model shows that heterogeneity in preferences for public goods among 16 
 
members of the same community is an obstacle to the increase of social welfare only in the event 
that    subjects  are  allowed  to  vote.  Table  6  displays  the  negative  and  significant  sign  of  the 
coefficients  of  these  variables  for  all  the  preference  sets.  In  contrast,  in  the  non  participation 
treatment  heterogeneity  does  not  directly  affect  the  social  welfare,  given  that  the  sign  of  the 
coefficients of the two variables changes and such variables are not always statistically significant. 
In other words, if the source of heterogeneity is two instead of one, i.e. not only public goods 
preferences but also voting participation, the decentralization and the sorting people option do not 
necessarily increase welfare.  
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
 
In  this  paper,  we  investigate  in  the  laboratory  the  effect  of  voting  participation  on  the 
validity of the Tiebout model. By comparing the participation and the non-participation treatments, 
we find that,  in  a pure Tiebout  framework, social  welfare  is  increased  by voting participation. 
Moreover, in the participation treatment the increase of individual welfare has a positive relation to 
the  number  of  moving  decisions  and  has  a  negative  relation  to  within-community  subject 
heterogeneity. In the non participation treatment, the increase in welfare has a positive correlation to 
the correct decision of moving only if the community is correctly chosen.  
Our findings support the view that the processes of ethnic fragmentation and decline of 
social  capital  due  to  migration  flows  can  affect  the  effectiveness  of  voting  with  the  feet  if 
participation in the voting process is low. The increase of individual heterogeneity within local 
communities  makes  the  efficiency-enhancing  property  of  the  Tiebout  model  dependent  on 
promoting  civic  engagement  and  political  participation.  The  option  voice  should  be  exercised 
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